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On 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan National Army forces supported by Dutch 
and American air forces conducted one of a series 
of incursions into the Zharey District west of 
Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation 
SEASONS, was representative of operations 
undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
this area and is an evolution from how Canadian 
ground forces have been employed since they 
were re-introduced to the region in 2005. This 
account is based on the personal experiences of 
the author who observed these combat operations 
while they were in progress.1
The Terrain
It has become a media cliché to use the phrase “the volatile Zharey District,” but it is fairly 
accurate. Zharey District occupies what amounts 
to a triangle of well-cultivated land north of the 
Arghandab river, west of Kandahar C i t y . 
The top of the triangle parallels 
Highway 1, the main and 
only paved east-west 
h i ghway  be tween 
K a n d a h a r  C i t y, 
Helmand province, 
and then to Herat. 
Highway 1 meets 
Highway 4 east 
of Kandahar City, 
which  in  turn 
links the entire southern part of Afghanistan 
with Spinboldak and then to Quetta in Pakistan. 
Insurgent forces occupying Zharey can 
theoretically interfere with commerce on Highway 
1 which can have detrimental economic effects 
on the region, not just the province. 
 South of Highway 1 can only be described 
in military terms as complex terrain. Though 
Zharey District is fairly small compared to 
other provincial districts, it consists of a dense-
packed array of grape-growing ditches, walled 
compounds, walled fields, irrigation streams 
covered with foliage, and narrow tracks. Grape 
drying huts, in the middle of the trench-like rows 
of grape ditches, are made of mud that has dried 
into concrete which effectively turns them into 
ready-made bunkers with firing ports. 
 South of the Arghandab River lies Panjwayi 
District which for the most part resembles 
Zharey District in terms of complex terrain. A 
steep hill line separates most of Panjwayi from 
the Arghandab River: the combination of the two 
presents a significant obstacle and discourages 
north-south traffic with two exceptions: there are 
fords at Bazaar-e Panjwayi, a significant town 
and market place; and another to the west. The 
terrain north of Highway 1 and to the west of 
Zharey is open and arid. The Reg Desert lies to 
the south and south west of Panjwayi District. 
 What of the human 
t e r r a i n ?  Z h a r e y 
District is the product 
of a redistricting 
process conducted 
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in 2003 designed to rationalize the physical 
conformation of the land to provincial district 
administration. Consequently, Zharey was 
carved out of several other districts: Panjwayi, 
Arghandab, and Maywand. The tribal overlay, 
of course, does not conform to the artificial 
administrative overlay. Zharey District is 
completely dominated by Pashtuns, though they 
come from both Pashtun Confederations: the 
Durrani and Ghilzai which have competed for 
dominance of the area for centuries. At least six 
tribal groups are present in Zharey District.
 Canada’s involvement with Zharey District 
dates from 2005-06 when the Canadian-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) working 
with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade attempted 
to assess the area for aid and reconstruction 
purposes. At that time American forces were 
attacked along Highway 1 on a regular basis 
by small numbers of Taliban forces operating 
from Zharey. Task Force BAYONET, which was 
understrength, focused on the Shah Wali Kot 
district of Kandahar Province and did not have 
the resources to deal with Zharey. At this time, 
most of the action was in Oruzgan Province 
north of Kandahar and Zabol Province to the 
northeast. The Shah Wali Kot district operations 
were supporting this effort. In effect, Zharey was 
a no-go area for the PRT, which instead focused 
its efforts on Panjwayi District and elsewhere. 
These contacts led to better information on 
activities in Zharey and when the Canadians 
took over Regional Command South (RC South) 
in January-February 2006, there was increased 
interest in the district. 
     Throughout the spring 
of 2006, it was more 
and more apparent that 
the Quetta Shura, the 
council leading the anti-
Afghanistan and anti-
coalition effort out of 
Pakistan, had shifted its 
operational approach 
to RC South. A steady 
increase in infiltration 
of both personnel and 
weapons was detected 
and by the summer 
several  pre - empt ive 
actions were conducted 
by Task Force ORION, the 
Canadian battlegroup based on 1st Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1 
PPCLI). One of these operations was the first full 
battalion-sized combat operation since Korea. 
The enemy was forced to either reinforce Zharey 
or pull out and leave a small presence. The Quetta 
Shura decided to make a stand and massively 
re-infiltrated Zharey in August 2006. This led to 
Operation MEDUSA, a Canadian-led, brigade-
sized multinational operation that inflicted 
significant damage on the enemy forces in Zharey 
and Panjwayi districts. There were, however, not 
enough resources to garrison Zharey with Afghan 
police or paramilitary forces.
    The follow-on operation, BAAZ TSUKA, was 
mounted in December 2006.  This was a Dutch-
led multinational operation (RC South had 
changed from Canadian to Dutch command) 
designed in part to sweep through Zharey once 
again and then leave an Afghan security force 
presence behind to facilitate development and 
aid activities. For the most part, enemy forces 
melted away in the face of the ISAF onslaught 
and reverted to pre-2006 tactics. Again, there 
were simply not enough police or paramilitary 
forces to exert control over the entire district 
and the development effort stalled in the western 
parts of the district. The decision was made to 
focus the police and aid effort on the quieter 
Panjwayi District and to contain Zharey as much 
as possible. 
 This effort was called Operation BAAZ TSUKA 
Phase III. NATO ISAF forces established an 
enduring presence in the area in the form of several 
Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008
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firebases to supplement existing 
ones. Forward Operating Base 
Masum Ghar (called FOB MSG 
by the troops) was constructed 
on the hills south of the river 
overwatching Zharey District. 
To the north along Highway 1 was Patrol Base 
Wilson (PBW) which had been established by 
TF ORION the previous year to assist with route 
control activities in order to facilitate the British 
deployment to Helmand Province. Other ISAF 
forces operated from Maywand district west of 
Zharey along Highway 1. 
The Plan
In the spring of 2007, the Canadian battlegroup, based on 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian 
Regiment (2 RCR), deployed to Zharey and 
Panjwayi districts. India Company, 2 RCR and “A” 
Squadron, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH 
(RC)) based out of MSG, while “C” Company, 3 
PPCLI and a detachment of M-777 guns from “D” 
Battery, 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery (2 RCHA) operated from the Sperwan 
Ghar (SWG) FOB located in Panjwayi. At this 
time, the Canadian Operational Mentoring and 
Liaison Team (OMLT), led by Lieutenant-Colonel 
(LCol) Ken Eyre, worked closely with elements 
from the Afghan National Army 205 Corps that 
were based out of MSG. LCol Rob Walker, the 
Commanding Officer of the battlegroup, knew 
that neither he nor the Afghan security forces had 
the resources to occupy Zharey and that those 
forces would not be available in the near future: 
there were barely enough to handle the vital parts 
of Panjwayi. Working with Major David Quick, 
officer commanding (OC) India Company, the 
battlegroup developed a concept of operations 
designed to keep enemy forces off-balance in 
Zharey, in effect to deny them the ability to 
re-build infrastructure that could serve as a 
mounting base later; to prevent any substantial 
build up of conventional or near conventional 
forces along the lines of what occurred in 2006; 
and to reduce the enemy’s ability to interfere 
with commerce and ISAF resupply traffic on 
Highway 1. 
 The everlasting issue of what constituted 
enemy activity in the district caused some 
problems. When Canadian forces built a combat 
road (Route SUMMIT) from Bazaar-e Panjwayi to 
Highway 1, there were unintended consequences. 
The construction of this road diverted water in 
the east end of Zharey. Age-old and intricate tribal 
agreements over water use were now disrupted. 
Certain communities now had the potential 
upper hand over others and resentments built up 
bordering on violence. A Canadian solution was 
to put in culverts to restore the water use patterns 
– but the culverts made ideal locations for IED 
(improvised explosive device) attack against 
forces using Route SUMMIT. When culverts 
were blown up, was this Taliban activity or not? 
If one community resorted to AK-47 use over a 
diverted stream, was this Taliban action? What 
if Canadian troops were caught in the crossfire? 
Or, what if Afghan police from one area were 
conducting activities on behalf of someone else for 
pay because they had not received monies from 
their own chain of command for months? These 
factors complicated any Canadian response to 
activity in Zharey District. That said, there were 
organized Taliban teams and sub-units operating 
in the area in significant but not overwhelming 
numbers. Their intent was to resuscitate the 
severely damaged Taliban structure in the 
district. 
 Indeed, the use of intelligence-driven 
operations placed a premium on the need for 
multiple information sources that could be rapidly 
cross-checked. Such operations demanded 
substantial understanding of personalities, 
Afghan tribal culture, local grievances, historical 
relationships and how all of this had evolved over 
the past 20 years. In all cases, the battlegroup 
and company commanders would have to operate 
with incomplete information and rely to a certain 
extent on their hard-won experience with Zharey 
Far right: Lieutenant-Colonel Rob 
Walker, commanding ofﬁcer of the 
Canadian battlegroup.
Right: Major David Quick, ofﬁcer 
commanding India Company, 2 RCR.
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District, something not easily transferable in any 
handover between units. Gut instinct became as 
important, possibly even more important, than 
any super-secret SIGINT intercept scooped up 
from something orbiting in space. 
 In effect, the battlegroup did not have a 
singular, linear plan like Operations MEDUSA or 
BAAZ TSUKA. The overall plan was to mount a 
series of short-term sorties into Zharey as targets 
presented themselves, or to conduct sorties to 
flush-out enemy in a particular area to force them 
to react into flight or fight mode. This approach 
meant that the limited number of ISAF and ANA 
forces did not need to garrison Zharey. It was 
denial, not occupation, that was key. Randomness 
was crucial. There was to be no pattern to 
coalition operations and the maximal use of night 
cover and deception operations was critical, given 
that the enemy had significant observation assets, 
knew exactly what the battlegroup consisted of 
and what it was capable of doing. MSG is a fairly 
exposed FOB on the side of a hill and an enemy 
scout with binoculars in Zharey does not have 
to leave home to see what is there. 
 A previous India Company operation had 
rattled enemy leadership in Zharey. Information 
came into battlegroup HQ that some 50 enemy 
fighters had narrowly avoided this previous 
sweep operation and were moving to link up with 
another cell, which was estimated to have 30 
fighters. These forces were equipped with AK-47 
and PKM automatic weapons, rocket-propelled 
grenades (RPGs), and 82 mm recoilless rifles. A 
dead enemy commander, killed during a parallel 
operation involving coalition special operations 
forces (SOF) was about to be replaced and the 
new leader was on his way. They would all be 
in the vicinity of the Howz-e Madad bazaar and 
compound complex. The planning cycle for 
Operation SEASONS had begun. 
 The geographical position of Howz-e Madad 
explains why this cluster of dun-coloured 
compounds is important. As Highway 1 traverses 
Zharey from east to west, it curves off from 
the Zharey green belt and heads northwest to 
Maywand District. The point where it curves off 
is the point where Zahrey’s green belt ends and 
arid open terrain starts. It is the last opportunity 
for insurgent forces to attack traffic on Highway 
1 and retreat into the complex terrain of the 
green belt. Ambushes west of the green belt are 
potentially suicidal. There is nowhere to run and 
a 25 mm round from a LAV-III (light armoured 
vehicle) or a 30 mm round from an AH-64 
Apache helicopter gunship is faster in any event. 
Ambush operations conducted from the west 
end of Zharey have a better chance of success to 
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The LAV-III infantry combat vehicle is the standard vehicle for 2 RCR in Afghanistan. The narrow hull allows it to penetrate 
constrained areas of Zharey District that would otherwise remain impassable. Its 25mm gun is devastating against 
enemy in the open or in positions.
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those conducted from the east end. At the east 
end, Zharey tapers into a point and there is less 
depth to retreat into before hitting the river and 
the hill line. 
 In addition, enemy infiltration routes and 
“rat lines” come into Zharey from west and south 
west, from Helmand Province. Enemy personnel 
usually rest in the western part of the district after 
their long journey before deploying to sites east. 
In addition larger weapons caches are broken 
down and then dispersed east. When truck traffic 
is used by the enemy, Howz-e Madad is the first 
stop along Highway 1, making it a convenient 
location. The police in the area are unreliable as 
the Taliban pays them more money with greater 
frequency than the government.
 The scheme of maneuver that Major Quick, 
LCol Walker and LCol Shereen Shah agreed 
on was to move India Company by LAV-III to a 
drop off point and conduct a night march into a 
blocking position south of Howz-e Madad. The 
LAV’s were to continue along the highway to 
draw enemy eyes away. Then two troops of the 
Strathconas’ Leopard C-2 tanks (callsign T-1A) 
led by Captain Craig Volstead accompanied by an 
Afghan infantry company from 2-1-205 Kandak 
(with the OMLT attached) mounted in armed 
pickup trucks, and the battlegroup command 
post (callsign 9er Tac) would then sortie from 
MSG, move along Highway 1 and then swing 
south to catch the enemy, like a hammer striking 
an anvil. 
The Action
At 0337 hours on 20 June, there was a slight delay in the departure of the tank-Afghan 
infantry force when a key member of the command 
post severely cut himself by accident. This was 
just as well as not all of the ISTAR resources2 
were in place: it took the Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (or TUAV - the Canadian Sperwer 
system) nicknamed SKIDOO (so-named because 
the machine has a Bombardier Skidoo engine), 
time to fly from its base to Zharey. At 0353 
hours, LCol Walker took the lead with his LAV-III 
and the force moved out along Route SUMMIT. 
India Company had already deployed and was 
in position. At 0430 9er Tac, accompanied by 
an artillery forward observation officer/forward 
air controller (FOO/FAC) LAV-III and a security 
element moved into a position north of Highway 
1 opposite Howz-e Madad. The area was carefully 
On-call artillery employed during the Howz-e Madad action included one M-177 155 mm gun ﬁring from a FOB in 
Panjwayi District. The M-777 is highly-accurate and is airportable when slung under CH-47 Chinook helicopters.
The Leopard C-2 medium tank is employed by “A” Squadron LdSH (RC) in operations in Zharey District. The
Leopard C-2 shown here is equipped with a mine plow not unlike those developed during the Second World War.
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c h e c k e d  f o r 
mines and IEDs on 
arrival. The first contact 
with the enemy was at 0435 
hours, just at dawn. Red tracer fire 
arced across the sky from west to east and a 
forward air controller immediately called for air 
support. The two on-call USAF A-10 Warthogs 
were now on the way. 
 The battle area requires some description. In 
effect, there were several compound complexes 
(see map on next page) and a wadi system, all 
surrounded by grape trenches. Each walled 
compound and its associated outbuildings 
formed natural defensive positions and usually 
held several extended families. In this case, the 
enemy had temporarily depopulated part of the 
area. The complexes were connected by narrow 
roads and tracks, most of them lined with high 
mud walls on either side. 
 India Company deployed to its blocking 
position called Objective RED without incident 
during the night. When the Leopard/Afghan 
National Army “hammer” came down south 
Left: This is an aerial photo of a typical compound complex 
in Zharey District. Note the walled ﬁelds and tree-covered 
irrigation streams.
Below: Grape growing trenches like this blanket the terrain 
in Zharey District. Note the grape drying huts irregularly 
spaced throughout the ﬁelds.
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from Highway 1 
to meet the “anvil” 
(Objective RED), there 
was no contact. Then the 
enemy started firing from Objective 
BLUE at the forces moving around 
Objective RED. But BLUE was southeast of 
RED, not north. India Company engaged BLUE 
but the enemy then opened up from BLACK, 
to the south of RED. And then from another 
location to the west, a single shooter wounded an 
ANA soldier from some distance. A “nine liner” 
MEDEVAC request went out and a US Army 
UH-60 Blackhawk was dispatched to collect 
the wounded. A variety of ISTAR assets were 
now orbiting the battle and the information was 
continuously fed to LCol Walker. Intelligence 
revealed a pickup truck with an enemy RPG 
team moving in from the west. A fire mission 
was called in to suppress the shooter and the 
RPG team. At this point there was a detachment 
of Canadian M-777 155 mm guns at another 
fire base, commanded by Lieutenant Eric Ross. 
Only one gun was operational, however, but the 
volume of fire made it look as if a half-battery 
was in action. 
 The Afghan company and OMLT started to 
conduct a detailed search of several compounds 
while the Leopard tanks moved to form a cordon. 
At this point, 0506 hours, a Canadian soldier 
Opposite: Afghan National Army soldiers set up behind 
a wall during a dawn skirmish with the Taliban.
M
ap
 d
ra
w
n 
by
 M
ik
e 
B
ec
ht
ho
ld
 ©
20
08
C
FJ
IC
 IS
20
07
-7
26
1
Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd   68 14/02/2008   12:58:49 PM
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol17/iss1/6
69
M
ap
 d
ra
w
n 
by
 M
ik
e 
B
ec
ht
ho
ld
 ©
20
08
C
FJ
IC
 IS
20
07
-7
26
1
Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd   69 14/02/2008   12:58:51 PM
7
Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008
70
was wounded and moved to a casualty collection 
point. India Company held Objective RED, the 
tanks were observing to the west, and the plan 
was now to move a platoon from India Company 
to Objective GREEN. ISTAR resources then 
detected what they suspected was a significant 
dismounted enemy force south of Objective 
BLACK. As the platoon was breaking contact from 
RED to move to GREEN, another Canadian was 
wounded. 
 The FOO/FAC co-located with India Company, 
callsign G 12, was engaged with RPG and small 
arms fire and saw the enemy was reinforcing from 
the southwest. The question for LCol Walker was 
this: was the enemy bringing in forces to cover 
an extraction of their engaged forces, or was the 
enemy reinforcing the fight? ISTAR resources 
were tasked to find out and were directed further 
south. India Company at this time was engaged by 
14 enemy personnel equipped with RPGs firing 
from positions directly south of BLACK and it 
looked like a pickup truck was moving in from 
the west to assist them. An A-10 was brought in 
to engage and it opened up with its GAU-8 30mm 
gun on these enemy forces.
 The situation as it stood at 0517 hours had a 
Canadian platoon with the Leopards on Objective 
GREEN preparing to move to Objective BLACK; 
a Canadian platoon on Objective RED, with the 
ANA company consolidating compounds behind 
the Canadian screen. Suddenly, 15 enemy were 
engaged northeast of GREEN. LCol Walker 
instructed the force to assume an all-round 
defensive posture, consolidate the interior of the 
“goose egg” and prepare to meet several attacks. 
The ANA company was to move to BLACK and 
sweep it east to west. 
 Three close air support missions were 
flown by USAF A-10s and the Dutch F-16s 
that showed up to replace them to the south 
of BLACK to suppress enemy fire. The three 
coalition wounded were by this time in an 
armoured TLAV ambulance (a modified and 
completely re-built M-113 APC) and were moving 
to a helicopter landing site for evacuation by the 
UH-60 Blackhawk. Significantly, the UH-60 came 
in alone without its usual AH-64 Apache escort. 
There were simply not enough AH’s available that 
morning with other coalition operations ongoing 
elsewhere. 
Above: A US Army UH-60 Blackhawk 
MEDEVAC stands off while the dust generated 
by an artillery strike abates. It will then ﬂy in 
and extract coalition casualties.
Left: A close-up of the American MEDEVAC 
helicopter as it lands to evacuate the 
wounded Afghan National Army soldiers.
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 Enemy survivors from the A-10 and F-16 
sorties tried to break contact and headed west. 
At the same time, five enemy with RPGs moved 
north to replace them and fired at Canadians in 
the vicinity of BLACK. Then enemy in a grape 
drying hut southeast of BLACK opened up 
with small arms. The TUAV also located three 
“squirters,” survivors of the A-10 strafing, hiding 
in a tree line. G 12, the artillery FOO/FAC, tried 
to acquire them when the TUAV then picked up 
what looked like 50 persons moving to the west 
of the battle. When queried, the operators noted 
that none appeared to be carrying weapons. 
Callsign 66B, a sniper detachment, then engaged 
enemy targets occupying rooftops to the west. 
Were the 50 people reinforcements? Were they 
civilians fleeing? Snipers observed individuals 
that were not part of the group equipped with 
RPGs and they looked like they were a separate 
entity. But nobody could be sure. Major Quick 
instructed that no action be taken until a positive 
identification could be made. 
 In effect, the combined Canadian-Afghan 
force was in a hedgehog posture at 0550 hours. 
LCol Walker’s intention was to let the enemy 
come to him and then kill them. It appeared as 
though there were enemy standing and fighting 
in small groups all around the hedgehog, some 
enemy were withdrawing, and at the same time it 
appeared as though there were two large groups 
of enemy approaching from the south and south 
west. At 0610 hours, the wounded were flown 
out by helicopter. 
 The snipers require some mention. Sniper 
information flowed into the command post like 
TUAV information and was a notable proportion 
of the information picture. At the same time, 66B 
snipers killed an enemy RPG team with shots at 
ranges of 700 metres. 
 At this time, the ANA encountered some 
insurgents hiding in the Objective BLACK 
compounds and set about clearing them. Searches 
continued for information as much as insurgents. 
LCol Walker took stock of the situation at 0605 
hours. The enemy was taken by surprise by the 
incursion. ISTAR information indicated this as 
did their behavior on the ground. It appeared as 
though the 50 persons to the west were civilians 
and not reinforcements, through there were still 
enemy present to the west in small numbers 
firing sporadically. The TUAV then spotted 
organized enemy on Objective YELLOW to the 
west. The Leopards traversed and opened fire. 
The situation at BLACK was, however, confused. 
As the Afghan company cleared the site, an RPG 
opened up on them from behind, i.e. to the north, 
which wounded two Afghan soldiers. A Leopard 
was brought in and the RPG team was killed with 
main armament fire. 
 The enemy again attempted to introduce 
two-man RPG teams into the interior of the 
hedgehog using grape trenches and wadi systems. 
There also appeared to be more enemy hiding in 
Objective BLACK. The Afghan company engaged 
in close combat in the compounds to ensure once 
and for all they were cleared. Then the TUAV 
operators reported that the enemy was hiding 
RPG teams among the civilian population moving 
south of BLACK. LCol Walker concluded that 
were using the civilians as shields and held fire. 
Above: A US Army UH-60 Blackhawk 
MEDEVAC stands off while the dust generated 
by an artillery strike abates. It will then ﬂy in 
and extract coalition casualties.
Left: A close-up of the American MEDEVAC 
helicopter as it lands to evacuate the 
wounded Afghan National Army soldiers.
Canadian commanders received crucial information during the battle from ISTAR resources, such as the Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (or TUAV - also known as the Canadian Sperwer system). Here, a Sperwer is launched from 
its base at Kandahar Airﬁeld.
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The Afghan company then struck gold. As they 
moved slightly east of BLACK, they uncovered a 
cache. They were immediately engaged, but were 
covered by Leopard HESH rounds and coaxial 
machinegun fire as they exploited this site. 
 New information arrived in the command 
post. The enemy was trying to introduce 82 mm 
recoilless rifle teams into the battle. Their intent 
was most likely to engage and kill a Canadian 
Leopard or other armoured vehicle. This would 
have significant spin-off effects. It would be a 
morale victory for enemy forces showing that 
tanks could be engaged and destroyed. It would 
have an impact in the Canadian media and tie 
up Canada’s military leadership who would be 
forced to explain to the vociferous critics why they 
deployed tanks to Afghanistan in the first place 
and why Canada needed tanks at all. Instructions 
were therefore issued to give priority to the 
destruction of anything resembling an 82 mm 
recoilless rifle team. 
 As another UH-60 arrived to evacuate the 
wounded around 0644 hours, the battle entered 
a lull. It was already getting stiflingly hot and 
in a matter of hours it would reach the point 
where Leopard crews in their un-air conditioned 
vehicles would be increasingly incapacitated. 
The crews joked that IV solution bags should 
be hung on the turret ceilings for re-hydration 
purposes. 
Below: Artillery strike goes in at Howz-e Madad 
as seen from the battlegroup command post 
vehicle.
Left: A group of Canadian Forces and Afghan 
National Army soldiers prepare to return ﬁre during 
a dawn skirmish with the Taliban.
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 A Canadian platoon and combat engineers 
from 42 Field Squadron consolidated Objective 
BLACK. There they found Taliban graffiti 
and weapons all over the complex. Sensitive 
Site Exploitation (SSE) and Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) activities commenced on 
several locations. SSEs are designed to produce 
intelligence on enemy structures, operations 
and intentions, while BDA is designed to assist 
in improving operational effectiveness. The 
engineers uncovered a significant cache at 
BLACK. Initial reports were that there were 
RPGs, artillery shells, and a variety of other 
explosives stockpiled there. The assessments 
continued when more reports came in that 
there was significant civilian movement to the 
west and southwest. At this point LCol Walker 
and Major Quick were considering a move onto 
Objective YELLOW to clean it out. Then at 0703 
hours a Canadian platoon and its accompanying 
Leopards were engaged with small arms fire. 
Simultaneously, back north of Highway 1 the 
battlegroup command post LAV III suddenly 
traversed its turret onto a white car that was 
moving at speed towards 9er Tac. The car was 
dissuaded from coming closer and sped off in the 
direction it came from. There is no classic “rear 
area” and all coalition forces must be capable 
of defending themselves at all times no matter 
what activity they are engaged in. There were a 
series of explosions to the west, which sounded 
like RPGs but remain unexplained as there was 
no damage to friendly forces. It is possible poor 
enemy ammunition handling resulted in the 
detonation of reinforcement stocks.
 After 0700 hours, the enemy renewed his 
activities to the southeast of BLACK. There were 
three groupings of Taliban firing onto BLACK but 
they were using cover: buildings, walls, grape 
trenches which all made target identification 
difficult for the Leopards and the platoon on 
BLACK. The Leopards used coaxial machine gun 
fire to suppress enemy fire while the infantry 
picked out individual insurgents and killed them 
with aimed shots. Fire resumed against BLACK 
Below: Artillery strike goes in at Howz-e Madad 
as seen from the battlegroup command post 
vehicle.
Left: A group of Canadian Forces and Afghan 
National Army soldiers prepare to return ﬁre during 
a dawn skirmish with the Taliban.
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Top: Sergeant Brian Durelle, India Company, 2 RCR, 
takes a breather while a Leopard tank stands watch.
Centre: A group of Canadian and Afghan National Army 
soldiers prepare to move against the Taliban.
Bottom: A group of Afghan National Army talk tactics 
following the action at Howz-e Madad.
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from the south as well, which brought with it an 
A-10 strafing run (the terrain south of BLACK is 
much more open and conducive to this type of air 
support). The two A-10s rolled in, popped flares, 
and fired extended bursts of its 30 mm gun, 
which sounds like heaven being ripped open. 
 Elements of the Afghan company in positions 
northwest of BLACK started taking sporadic fire 
and a Badger armoured engineer vehicle was 
moved in to breach a high wall so that the Afghans 
could deal with this threat. There was another 
lull that lasted until 0726 hours. Another SSE, 
this one conducted by the Afghans, discovered 
a Taliban command post which had significant 
information in it. Then enemy ammunition cached 
in a grape drying hut exploded without warning 
and everyone took cover. Other SSE activities 
uncovered RPG launchers and RPG rounds. 
Most important, a stock of artillery rounds that 
were in the process of being converted to IEDs 
was discovered, as were IED detonators and 
other critical components necessary for their 
manufacture. BLACK, it turned out, was the base 
of a Taliban IED cell and it afforded insight into 
current IED techniques and procedures. A large 
amount of ammunition was found throughout 
the battle area. 
 ISTAR resources then detected 30 enemy 
moving west on a route south of the battle area 
– they appeared to be fleeing. At 0745 hours the 
Provincial Operations Centre reported that an 
IED attack in Panjwayi District to the south had 
killed two people – it was not clear whether they 
were coalition forces, civilians, or police. One 
interpretation was that it was designed to draw 
attention away from the Howz-e Madad battle. 
 The next contact was at 0750 hours. Four 
Taliban equipped with an RPG and PKM machine 
gun were running away from the battle area. 
Inexplicably, two pickup trucks with four Taliban 
equipped with anti-tank weapons and then a 
motorcycle team approached the battle area from 
Top: Canadian Forces Medical Technicians Corporal 
Sonja Briere (foreground) and Corporal Vay Tu care 
for an Afghan National Army soldier wounded during 
operations on 20 June 2007.
Centre & Bottom: Canadian Forces Combat Engineers 
carry the wounded Afghan soldier to a waiting armoured 
TLAV ambulance
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southeast of Objective BLACK. A Leopard opened 
fire with HESH and coaxial machine gun fire and 
took them out at a range of 200 metres.
 These two Leopards slowly advanced south 
of BLACK when they were engaged by enemy 
anti-tank weapons. One of Leopards, equipped 
with a plough, took the hit on the device but the 
vehicle remained operational. As this position 
was slightly south of the limit of exploitation 
established for the operation, they were ordered 
back to BLACK.
 More information came in about the IED 
strike in Panjwayi District. It turned out that a 
Canadian vehicle was hit, but the situation was 
developing. While 9er Tac was dealing with this 
new incident, an A-10 on a strafing run fired 
on the road next to an Afghan platoon narrowly 
missing them. This resulted in a temporary check 
fire. Another IED strike was reported in Panjwayi 
District, but it was unclear if this was follow-on 
reportage of the first incident or if it was another 
incident. 
 As LCol Walker and Major Quick planned the 
withdrawal from Howz-e Madad, “C” Company, 3 
PPCLI in Panjwayi reported that three Canadians 
on a re-supply run on a Gator vehicle had been 
blown up by a massive IED. This was a stunning 
development. It was unlikely that this attack 
was unrelated to the morning’s operations 
and it was probable that it was designed to 
draw off resources from the Howz-e Madad 
operation. Indeed, ISTAR, medical, engineering, 
and investigative resources would have to be 
moved and employed in another district. They 
would have to be protected. They might be 
ambushed. They might require extraction. And 
the battlegroup was not yet finished with Howz-
Top: An US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack 
aircraft performs a low-level straﬁng run ﬁring its 30 mm 
cannon. Aircraft like these provided close air support 
to Canadian and Afghan forces during the ﬁghting at 
Howz-e Madad.
Centre: Private Glynn Doucette of India Company, 
2 RCR, indicates how well things are going as he and 
his section members set up an all-round defence.
Bottom: Badger armoured engineering vehicles are 
used for hasty road repairs and for breaching operations 
in close terrain. In this case, the damage caused by a 
culvert IED on Route SUMMIT had to be dealt with.
P
ho
to
 b
y 
au
th
or
U
S
 A
ir 
Fo
rc
e 
ph
ot
o
C
FJ
IC
 IS
20
07
-7
23
4
Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd   75 14/02/2008   12:59:03 PM
13
Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008
76
Above and below: Canadian soldiers search a suspected Taliban 
compound.
Left: Corporal Cassidy Tait of India Company, 2 RCR returns from 
clearing an Afghan compound 
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e Madad. Sporadic engagements were occurring 
around the perimeter. 
 One of these engagements involved an 
insurgent equipped with a Dragunov sniper rifle. 
This individual, firing at a range of 300 metres 
from a rooftop and then a grape drying hut west 
of Objective RED, was bracketing his Canadian 
and Afghan targets but not actually hitting them. 
What he lacked in experience, he tried to make 
up with determination. There was talk about 
using air power to get him, in part to boost the 
morale of the Afghan troops he was targeting. 
He was, however, mobile. One of the tank crew 
commanders reported hearing the “crack-thump” 
of the Dragunov within 10 metres of his vehicle. 
The tank was instructed to pop smoke and then 
pull away from the building so that a 500-pound 
bomb could be used against the sniper.
 The exfiltration of India Company, the 
Afghans, and the tanks was not simply a 
matter of driving away. As with every incursion 
operation, the danger was that the force would 
be ambushed on the way back to the MSG FOB. 
The routes were predictable – Highway 1 to 
SUMMIT with its culverts, across the Argendab, 
and into the FOB. It was always possible that 
suicide vehicle IED specialists from Kandahar 
City could be requested by Zharey District 
insurgents to attack along Highway 1. Another 
cell could use its anti-tank weapons and so on. 
A variety of deceptive means were employed to 
reduce this possibility, but the ace in the hole 
was a pair of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters 
that suddenly arrived over head, both sporting 
white “E”s on their undersides. Afghan police 
would form a cordon between Howz-e Madad and 
the exfiltrating force while the AH-64’s provided 
top cover all the way back to MSG. There were 
no further contacts on the way back to the FOB 
and now attention shifted to dealing with the 
aftermath of the Gator attack. This IED incident 
completely overshadowed the Howz-e Madad 
operation (which received no Canadian media 
coverage) and dominated public discourse for 
CFJIC IS2007-7267
CFJIC IS2007-7266
CFJIC IS2007-7250 Private Jamie Burton watches a gate leading from a garden
onto a pathway during  the operation at Howz-e Madad.
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several weeks while pundits debated the blame 
and merits of using Gators in Afghanistan. 
The Results
Operation SEASONS was only one of several similar incursions into Zharey District in 
the summer of 2007. The cumulative effects of 
the battlegroup plan are difficult to measure this 
close to the action, but a tentative assessment 
can be attempted. First, during the entire battle 
commercial truck traffic on Highway 1 did not 
abate at any time, even when there were air 
strikes in progress and prodigious amounts of 
tracer arced over the road. Civilian car traffic did 
not stop either, though it tended to route itself 
north of the action into the desert and then back 
on to the highway. Thus far the enemy has been 
unable to seriously interfere with the movement of 
coalition or commercial traffic on this route. The 
Howz-e Madad IED cell was forcibly dismantled 
and it will take months to replace it. 
 The enemy has not been able to use Zharey 
District as a mounting base for conventional 
operations against Kandahar City. He has not 
been able to attrit coalition or Afghan forces by 
using the district as a trap as he has attempted to 
do in the past. This key terrain remains disputed 
and is dominated by coalition and Afghan forces. 
The enemy has only been able to export terrorist 
violence from Zharey into adjacent districts 
with limited effect and he certainly does not 
exert control over the population of the adjacent 
districts. He has been unable to inflict mass 
casualties during these operations and has 
chosen to use massive IED attacks to do so with 
the intent of generating strategic effects on the 
population and political leadership in Canada. 
 In sum, Operation SEASONS successfully 
built on the base established during previous 
actions in Zharey District conducted throughout 
2006. It demonstrates that denial can be as 
important as occupation for key terrain, but 
only temporarily. In order to succeed in Zharey 
District, the population needs to shift its 
allegiance to the government side. Until effective 
governance capacity can be implemented in 
Zharey District, denial will have to suffice. The 
enemy’s decision to focus on Zharey ultimately 
benefits the coalition forces and the Afghan 
government as it permits reconstruction and aid 
activities to continue elsewhere in the province to 
the detriment of the Taliban cause. ISAF is happy 
to oblige them.
Notes
1. In the interests of operational security, certain aspects 
of the action have been blurred and the names of code-
named geographical locations have been changed. 
The exception is Route SUMMIT, which has appeared 
regularly in the media.
2. ISTAR or Intelligence Surveillance and Targeting systems 
is a term used to represent the intelligence community 
and the various surveillance platforms available to collect 
the information. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are ISTAR 
assets but not all ISTAR assets are UAVs.
Part of the haul taken back to base for analysis. Note the 82mm recoilless riﬂe and the brand-new rounds for it-with 
Chinese markings. 
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